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AbstrAct
In this paper, we propose a simple task for eliciting attitudes toward risky choice, the Sabater-Grande and Geor-
gantzís (SGG) lottery-panel task, which consists in a series of lotteries constructed to compensate riskier options 
with higher risk-return trade-offs. Using Principal Component Analysis technique, we show that the SGG lottery-
panel task is capable of capturing two dimensions of individual risky decision making:  subjects’ average willingness 
to choose risky projects and their sensitivity towards variations in the return to risk. We report results from a large 
dataset obtained from the implementation of the SGG lottery-panel task and discuss regularities and the desirability 
of its bi-dimensionality both for describing behaviour under uncertainty and explaining behaviour in other contexts.
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resumeN
En este trabajo proponemos una tarea sencilla que permite obtener la actitud frente a la toma de riesgo 
monetario, y que llamaremos tarea Sabater-Grande y Georgantzís (SGG) de riesgo. Esta tarea consiste 
en una serie de loterías construidas para compensar las opciones de mayor riesgo con un mayor retorno. 
Utilizando la técnica de componentes principales, encontramos que la tarea SGG es capaz de capturar dos 
dimensiones de la toma de decisiones individuales: por un lado, la voluntad promedio de los sujetos de elegir 
proyectos arriesgados y, por otro, su sensibilidad hacia las variaciones en el retorno por riesgo. Presentamos 
los resultados de una gran muestra de datos obtenidos a partir de la implementación de la tarea SGG, y dis-
cutimos las regularidades y la conveniencia de su bidimensionalidad tanto para describir el comportamiento 
en condiciones de incertidumbre como para explicar el comportamiento humano en otros contextos.
PAlAbrAs clAve
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iNtroductioN
Human beings are usually acting in different contexts and environments. Each individual 
expresses needs, preferences, attitudes, and ideologies through different actions in each 
of the domains in which he or she chooses or simply happens to be. As contexts become 
closer or somehow related to each other, actions by the same individual should also 
become more related in one way or another. In fact, in an ideal world in which a subjects’ 
personality is a compact and stable system of values and idiosyncratic features, behavior 
in related contexts should confirm the revelation of the same person. Based on this idea, 
social scientists like psychologists and economists often try to explain behavior hetero-
geneity through idiosyncratic differences across subjects. Such differences are usually 
captured by exposing individuals to decision making tasks or attitude questionnaires. 
Famous examples are a plethora of intelligence tests and personality inventories used 
by the psychologists to asses an individual’s performing skill and propensity to one or 
another type of action. 
 In order to produce reliable tests, it is necessary to invest a substantial amount of 
effort in (i) developing the task and proposing it to the scientific community, (ii) standar-
dizing the format and applying it among large populations, (iii) generating result distribu-
tions by subject category and (iv) identifying successful tasks as reliable approximations 
of an idiosyncratic factor. Moreover, the search of associations among decisions in diffe-
rent tasks is a main motivator for experimentalists. For example, when studying the 
effects of intelligence on complex decision making, psychologists correlate scores in, 
say, Raven (1976)’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), and performance in com-
plex microworlds, like NEWFIRE or COLDSTORE (Rigas, Carling and Brehmer 2002). 
Beyond the question of what explains what, a systematic rejection of such associations 
would confine experimental results to the specific setting in which they were obtained, 
undermining the practical relevance of the research outside the lab. This process is 
parallel and significantly synergic to the very important endeavor of producing correct 
theories on the measured aspect itself. However, metaphorically speaking, looking for 
appropriate tasks in the absence of a perfect theory is like the practice in medicine of 
establishing clinical protocols for the cure of a disease even before the disease is fully 
understood.
 Paradoxically, economists have failed so far to agree upon the systematic use of a 
stable task eliciting individual attitudes towards monetary uncertainty. Even the need 
for external risk measurements is often not recognized by some economists, frequently 
explaining the effect of risk preferences on observed behavior by theoretically deriving 
the sufficient conditions for this effect to emerge, thus explaining fact Y  by its sufficient 
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(but not necessary) condition X  (e.g., Cox and Oaxaca 1996; Goeree, Holt and Palfrey 
2002; Campo et al.. 2002). Furthermore, in the few cases in which a task has been used 
more often than others this has not been done in a systematic way, creating small non 
comparable samples of observations. Thus, experience and statistical significance have 
not been built in a cumulative way. Even worse, the so called risk attitude tests are igno-
ring past evidence and new theories on individual behavior in risky contexts. 
 In this paper, we propose a decision making task which is specific to individual deci-
sion making in contexts involving uncertainty of the monetary consequences of one’s 
actions. Given the importance of uncertainty in modern societies exposed to macroeco-
nomic financial shocks, linking individual attitudes towards risk with actions in other 
domains would give us a powerful tool to assess the role of personality traits on market 
functioning. The task discussed in the following pages provides a context for the elicita-
tion of risk attitudes in a way that is both compatible with the need for a multidimensional 
assessment and robust to alternative mathematical specifications and parameterizations 
of the model used to organize the data.
 The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews economic 
theories of risky decision making and comments on some devices used to elicit risk atti-
tudes as an external explanatory factor of behavior in other contexts. Section 3 reports 
results obtained from the application of the lottery-panel test by Sabater-Grande and 
Georgantzís (2002), SGG. Section 4 concludes. In a longer working paper, we provide 
more information on the design of the test, as well as instructions for subjects and the 
experimenter (García-Gallego et al. 2010). 
ecoNomic ANd PsycholoGicAl theories ANd tests of risk Attitudes
It is well known that individuals faced with a probability p to earn a given amount of 
money x may be willing to pay less or more than the product p·x to earn access to 
this possibility. From a mathematical point of view the product p·x should be used as a 
certainty equivalent of the aforementioned lottery. Thus, if the probability p of earning 
x € were evaluated by its mathematical expectation, all people would accept to pay 
less and would reject to pay more than a certain amount of p·x € in order to participate 
in the lottery. But, as we know, people are not mathematical machines, nor identical 
problem solving automata. 
 An early explanation of why subjects do not evaluate risky choices by their mathe-
matical expectation is attributed to the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) (von Neuman 
and Morgestern 1944). According to the theory, when comparing a lottery,
 
€ 
L1 = ( p11,x11€
€ 
;...p1n ,x1n  €
with 
€ 
L2 = ( p21,x21€ mm xp 22 ,;... € ) , 
where 
€ 
pji 	    is the probability that the i th best outcome of lottery j occurs, yielding a 
)
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reward of 
€ 
xij  €, an agent whose utility is )(xU , with 0(*)' >U , will strongly prefer 
1L  to 2L , as long as 
(1)     
The preference for less risky projects is then explained by a negative second derivative 
of )(xU , implying a decreasing marginal utility from money, a condition often used as 
synonymous to risk aversion. Despite its survival as the main paradigm in economics as 
observed by Rabin and Thaler (2001), the EUT was proved to be an incorrect descrip-
tive model since Allais’ (1953) paradox, emerging when subjects are faced to alternative 
lottery pairs with same probability/reward ratios. According to (1), such lotteries should 
be ranked in the same way, whereas people systematically change their choice in favor 
of the certain payoff when this becomes part of the feasible set. Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979) proposed an alternative model, Prospect Theory (PT), assuming that people 
implicitly use nonlinear weights )( pw  to evaluate probabilities. Therefore, in our exam-
ple, 1L  would be strongly preferred to 2L , if:
(2)    
That is, not only the outcomes create non linear utility responses but also probabilities 
are distorted in the decision maker mind. Therefore, new possibilities emerge concerning 
what we could expect from a rational decision maker’s actions. Consequently, PT accom-
modates Allais’ paradox, whereas it reduces to EUT for ppw =)( . Also, observing 
that losses and gains are processed differently, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assumed 
later a power utility function defined separately over gains and losses:
axxU =)(  if 0>x , and                              for 0<x . 
So a  and b are risk aversion parameters, and  λ  is the coefficient of loss aversion. This 
new version, called Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), defines probability weighting 
over the cumulative probability distributions, offering an explanation of risk-loving behav-
ior for payoffs below their reference point (losses), while exhibiting risk-averse behavior 
for rewards above their reference point (gains). The form of the probability weighting 
function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) has been widely used for both 
separable and cumulative versions of PT, and assumes weights,
 
€ 
p1i ⋅U(x1i) >
i=1
n
∑ p2i ⋅U(x2i)
i=1
m
∑
€ 
w( p) = pγ / pγ + (1 − p)γ[ ]1/ γ 	  
€ 
U(x) = −λ(−x)b 	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Therefore, in its simplest formulation, CPT explains risk attitudes using a minimum of four 
parameters, a , b , λ  and  γ.
 Our overview does not pretend to narrate the history of economic theories of decision 
making. In fact, we have intentionally omitted heuristics and other theories which cannot 
be used to propose tasks for the elicitation of risk attitudes. Also, for space reasons we 
omit the theory proposed by Birnbaum and Navarrete (1998) which can explain viola-
tions of stochastic dominance by introducing a third component of risky decision making, 
namely the attention paid by subjects to the best outcomes among those feasible in 
a given lottery. We simply want to stress the fact that the evolution of these theories 
achieves the aim of accommodating phenomena which invalidated earlier theories by the 
use of more degrees of freedom.  
 Contrary to this evolution of theories towards more complete and complex descrip-
tions of human behavior in risky environments, all tests currently used are fundamen-
tally uni-dimensional, despite their creation in the post-PT era. This does not mean 
that all studies of behavior under uncertainty have ignored the multi-dimensional 
approach dictated by modern theories. In fact, a fruitful line of research has specifi-
cally designed and analyzed experimental data to estimate parameters for utility and 
probability weighting functions, such as the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability 
weighting function and other specifications like, for example, Goldstein and Einhorn’s 
(1987) and Prelec’s (1998) two-parameter specification. Furthermore, the nonlinearity 
of responses to probabilities has even been confirmed at the level of neural responses 
(Hsu et al. 2009), and, for aversive outcomes (Berns et al. 2008). However, in order 
to produce ready-to-use data, the elicitation of risk attitudes as an explanatory factor 
of behavior in another context should not depend on the parameterization or even 
the theory used. Mapping choices on parameters of utility and probability weighting 
functions is further complicated by the observation that we may even have to switch 
between theories in order to account for the heterogeneity observed (Harrison and 
Rutström 2009).
 In recent economic studies, a measure of risk aversion is obtained by the use of the 
Holt and Laury (2002) HL procedure. Although the task was not, initially, proposed as an 
external risk-related task to explain behavior in other contexts, it has served this purpose 
in several occasions (e.g., Goeree, Holt and Palfrey 2003; Lusk and Coble 2005; Har-
rison, List and Towe 2007; Andersen et al. 2008). Due to its uni-dimensionality, costlessly 
allowing a one-to-one mapping of choices on specific utility parameters, the test entails a 
possible loss of information due to under-specification of risk attitudes, which is also likely 
to reduce its power to explain behavior in other contexts. This is also true for the whole 
set of alternative procedures used by economists to elicit risk attitudes (e.g., Wakker and 
Deneffe 1996; Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000; Abdellaoui 2000; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and 
Paraschiv 2007; Hey and Orme 1994; Camerer and Ho 1994; Carbone and Hey 2000; 
Stott 2006). 
 The HL task elicits one individual datum from each block of 10 binary choices, 
designed to obtain the switching point from a less risky to a more risky alternative. This 
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causes a practical problem since some choices do not satisfy the “single-switching” con-
dition. Posterior applications have opted for different solutions to this problem, leading 
to a variety of alternative implementations which, together with the plethora of designs 
aimed at identifying other biases of the set up, have created a —undesirable, for our 
purposes— plethora of non comparable datasets. Contrary to the problem of non com-
parability among small data sets, several studies (e.g., Wang, Rieger and Hens 2010; 
Weber and Hsee 1998, 1999) use hypothetical simple questions among large and even 
international samples, which however have not been used to explain behavior in other 
contexts. 
 A broadly used test among psychologists is Zuckerman’s (1979) Sensation Seeking 
Scale (SSS) with which our test exhibits some correlation (Georgantzís et al. 2003). 
The test is structured as a YES-NO questionnaire on attitudes towards risky activi-
ties, under four subscales separating subject’s riskiness in different domains, none of 
which is, strictly speaking, financial. The economic domain of risk is used in the Iowa 
Gambling Task (Bechara et al. 1994). The task was originally aimed at measuring a 
subject’s difficulty to identify the most profitable deck, from which he or she should, 
thereafter, extract all cards. Using the task as an external risk attitude elicitation device 
implies significant loss of control, because it mixes risk preferences with a subject’s 
learning ability (a “slow” learner can be confused with a risk loving subject or one with 
low levels of loss aversion) and it does not fully account for different learning histo-
ries. For space reasons, we will not review other tests occasionally used to elicit risk 
attitudes as an explanatory factor of behavior in other contexts. Rather, we will risk a 
generalization. All existing tasks suffer from either lack of systematic replication in a 
stable format generating statistics with large comparable datasets, or they are insuf-
ficiently justified as measures of risk attitudes isolated from other parallel phenomena. 
Furthermore, they are all uni-dimensional.                 
 
the sGG lottery-PANel tAsk
The SGG lottery-panel task was originally used to study risk preferences parallel to coo-
peration/competition in prisoner’s dilemma games. Riskier subjects were found to be 
more cooperative. The task consists of four different panels, like those in Figure 1, every 
one of which contains ten different lotteries. In each lottery, subjects can win a payoff 
)(x  with a probability )( p  and otherwise nothing.
 Subjects choose (marking the preferred lottery as in the example of Figure 1) one 
of the ten lotteries from each panel. In the implementation of the task with real money, 
only one of these four panels, selected randomly at the end of the session, is used to 
determine a subject’s earnings in the experiment. The range of winning probabilities in all 
panels is the same (from 1 to 0.1 in steps of 0.1). The payoff associated to each lottery’s 
winning probability is constructed using the rule:
€ 
i ∈ 1,2,...,10{ }
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(3)  
 
   is the expected value of lottery ijL , where    
designates one of the 10 lotteries offered in panel
 
€ 
j ∈ 1,2,3,4{ }
The parameter jc  is a constant amount of money which is fixed for this dataset to 1€. 
The parameter
  
is a panel-specific risk premium, which generates an increase in the lotteries’ expected 
values as we move from safer to riskier options within the same panel. All the panels 
begin with a sure amount of 1€, which is increased as winning probabilities are decrea-
sed, resulting in increments of expected values as we move from left to right within each 
	  
Figure 1. 
The SGG lottery-panel test and example of subject choices
€ 
i ∈ 1,2,...,10{ }
€ 
t j ∈ 0.1,1,5,10{ }	  
€ 
E(Lij ) = pij ⋅ xij = cj + (1 − pij ) ⋅ tj ⇒ xij =
cj + (1 − pij ) ⋅ tj
pij
	  
€ 
E (Lij ) 	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panel. These increments are larger as we move from panel 1 to panel 4. This structure 
implies that more risk-averse subjects choose lotteries closer to the left of a panel.
 Intuitively, this test exposes subjects to the entire range of probabilities and a syste-
matic spectrum of monetary rewards from 1€ to the relatively high payoff of 100€. At the 
same time, the test offers a range of different returns to risk so that a more risk averse 
subject might refuse to take risky options in the first or the second panel, but could be 
attracted to risky prospects when a high return is offered in panel 3 and 4. Thus, unlike 
all uni-dimensional tests, this task may be used to classify subjects not only according to 
their willingness to take risks, but also with respect to their propensity to change across 
different risk return combinations. This idea is further developed in the following pages.  
 In terms of EUT, a subject with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), as implied in 
the utility function,
 
makes choices which associate higher risk aversion parameters r to safer choices in 
each panel, moreover, for a given risk aversion parameter, weakly monotonic transi-
tions towards riskier choices are predicted as we move from panel 1 to panel 4 (García-
Gallego et al. 2011).  All risk neutral and risk loving subjects should choose the lotteries 
at the far right extreme of the panels. 
 Considering the fact that with 4 choices the researcher obtains 4 different observa-
tions (as opposed to 10 choices for 1 observation in HL) per individual subject, we can 
easily see that the test parsimoniously produces a panel rather than a single column 
of data. By definition, this corresponds to a multi-dimensional description of individual 
attitudes towards risk.
a large dataset
Since its first implementation, the SGG test has been used in several occasions produc-
ing various small experimental datasets (e.g., Georgantzís et al. 2003; Brañas-Garza, 
Georgantzís and Guillén 2007; Brañas-Garza, Guillén and López del Paso 2008; García-
Gallego et al. 2011). Here, we report results from a large dataset (N=785), obtained 
between 2003 and 2008, at the Laboratorio de Economía Experimental (LEE, Univer-
sitat Jaume I, Castellón-Spain) under comparable conditions, paying special attention 
to the bi-dimensional nature of decision making and its implications for the explanation 
of behavior in other contexts. Figure 2 depicts the frequency of choices when all data 
from all panels are pooled together. Given the variation in prizes and payment methods, 
this image corresponds to what could be seen as a randomized experiment over the 
probability space. The peak on the certain payoff captures a certainty effect. A peak 
on the other extreme (p=0.1) as well as a valley on p=0.9 are both compatible with 
over (under) weighting of small (large) probabilities predicted in PT.  Strong attraction 
of choices towards the “center” (p=0.5) may be the result of subjects’ familiarity with 
€ 
U(x) = x
1−r
1− r
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Figure 2. 
Histogram of subjects’ pooled probabiity choices across 
all panels and implementation conditions
the p=½ probability or simply because of an embedding bias similar to that reported by 
Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (2006) on HL. No matter what causes this attraction to 
the center, this property favors close-to-normal distributions of the resulting variable, 
making it appropriate for simple OLS regressions.    
 In Figure 3 we present the same dataset broken down by panel, gender and reward 
method (hypothetical, N=384; real money, N=401). Males are less risk-averse than fema-
les. However, males and females behave in more different ways when playing hypothe-
tical lotteries than real ones. Actually, with real rewards, mean choice varies significantly 
across genders only in panel 3 and 4 (2.7 and 3.9 percentage points at 5% and 1% 
confidence level, respectively). Responsiveness to risk-premium increases, captured by 
choice variation across panels, is similar for males and females. Specifically, when faced 
with hypothetical payoffs, both males and females make less risk-averse choices, the 
higher the reward, while, counterintuitively, when playing with real payoffs, riskier choices 
are observed in panels with lower risk-returns.  
 We have argued that it should be a main concern for experimentalists and decision 
theorists whether a subject’s decision under one condition meaningfully relates to beha-
vior under another condition. 
 Figures 4 and 5 present an aspect of behavior which is missed by other tests. Each 
graph presents the joint density of individual choices across panel pairs. Each color 
represents a percentage, i.e. the proportion of subjects whose choice combinations in 
each panel pair correspond to that specific chart label. Higher risk aversion in one panel 
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Figure 3.
Histograms of subjects’ probability choices by panel, 
implementation conditions and gender
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Figure 4.
 Subject’s choices across panel pairs for hypothetical payoff lotteries. 
Legend percentage ranges refer to proportion of subjects choosing 
combinations indicated in each chart label 
[color online]
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Figure 5.
 Subjects’ choices across panel pairs for real payoff lotteries. Legend 
percentage ranges refer to proportion of subjects choosing 
combinations indicated in each chart label 
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predicts a higher risk aversion in another and, at the same time, reactions to the variation 
of risk returns across different panels seem to be rather moderate. 
 As expected, reactions are more visible across more “distant panels”, showing that a 
bigger shock is necessary to guarantee a change of choices. This within-subject pattern 
reproduces in a more reliable way what we have already observed, namely, that the 
use of real rewards makes subjects to switch to safer options in the presence of higher 
returns to risk.
principal component analysis
It is clear that multidimensional descriptions of risk attitudes require obtaining more 
than one choice per individual. This is done by the SGG test through the use of the four 
panels. However we have not shown yet that, first, the additional information obtained 
significantly improves the description of behavior and, second, that this improvement 
leads to a higher power of our task to explain behavior in other contexts.
 We use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to construct two synthetic variables (the 
first two components) capturing 85% of subjects’ choice variance. These variables have 
the following advantages: (1) they are subject to economic interpretation and, (2) since 
they are by construction orthogonal among each other, they can be used as explanatory 
variables of the same model. Intuitively, the first component can be interpreted as an 
arithmetic mean of choices across the four panels given that the loads of each panel in 
this component are similar and of the same sign. The second component involves a jux-
taposition of panels 1 and 2 on one hand and 3 and 4 on the other, which can intuitively 
be seen as a measure of sensitivity to risk-premium variations. As observed in Table 1, 
the component is loaded more by the extreme panel 1 (negatively) and 4 (positively) than 
by choice differences across the adjacent panels, 2 and 3. Intuitively, the first component 
is increasing in the average probability of the lottery chosen in the four panels and can 
be seen as a standard measure of risk aversion. The second component can be seen 
as a measure of a subject’s sensitivity to variations in the return to risk in the “counterin-
tuitive” direction of lower risk taking in the presence of higher returns to risk. While this 
confirms our comments on Figures 4 and 5, it provides a formal motivation for the use of 
bi-dimensional descriptions of risk attitudes, summarized as individual choice averages 
and choice variability across contexts (panels). 
 Using these two components we reconsider gender and hypothetical/real reward 
effects. It can be seen on Figure 6 that gender differences are specific to the first com-
ponent, while they diminish or even vanish in the second component. Therefore, males 
are less risk averse than females but both genders are similar in terms of their sensitivity 
to variations in the return to risk. Regarding differences between hypothetical and real 
rewards, both components are relevant. According to the first component, subjects make 
safer choices in hypothetical lotteries, while, according to the second component they 
switch more across panels with real rewards, but opposite to the expected pattern of 
riskier choices for higher risk-returns.
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Table 1. 
Cumulative percentages of components eigenvalues (top) and loads per component (bottom)
using the sGG test to explain behavior: an example
García-Gallego et al. (2005) conducted experiments on pricing where firms have some 
captive clients and they also compete for informed consumers using price comparisons 
on the Internet. During 50 periods, subjects face the dilemma of setting high prices to 
benefit from captive clients or lower prices to compete for informed consumers too. Para-
llel to the main experiment controlling for more and less competitive markets and com-
plete or incomplete price indexing (Treatments T1-T4), the SGG risk elicitation task 
was implemented with hypothetical rewards. 
 Following the estimates on Table 2 and abstracting from the specifics of the main 
experiment, we see that risk attitudes provide significant explanatory power for the 
pricing behavior observed. In fact, both first and second principal components are 
necessary to identify the effect of risk attitudes on pricing behavior. On one hand, the 
first component capturing safe choices is associated to more competitive pricing. That 
is, more risk-averse subjects set lower prices in order to avoid the risk of not having 
the lowest price indexed by the engine. On the other hand, the second principal com-
ponent is also associated with lower pricing. This means that subjects, recognizing the 
Component Eigenvalue Percentage (%) Cumulative %
Comp. 1 2.742*** 68.54 68.54
Comp. 2 0.670*** 16.75 85.29
Comp. 3 0.307*** 7.67 92.96
Comp. 4 0.282*** 7.04 100
Panel Coefficient Std. Error
Comp. 1
Panel 1 0.489*** 0.016
Panel 2 0.517*** 0.013
Panel 3 0.521*** 0.013
Panel 4 0.472*** 0.017
Comp. 2
Panel 1 -0.577*** 0.029
Panel 2 -0.372*** 0.035
Panel 3 0.317*** 0.036
Panel 4 0.654*** 0.027
(***) significant at 1% confidence level.
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Figure 6. 
Kernel density estimates for first and second component scores, by gender and reward method
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increased profitability of riskier choices across panels, also realize that setting higher 
prices guarantees profits which do not depend on the excessive randomness of the 
search process.
Table 2. 
Random effects GLS regression: Pricing explained by risk attitudes.
coNclusioNs
We have discussed the properties of risk attitudes as captured by the SGG elicitation 
task. The danger of using uni-dimensional descriptions of risk attitudes goes beyond 
the incompatibility with modern economic theories like PT, CPT etc., all of which call for 
tests with multiple degrees of freedom. Faithfull to this prescription, the contribution of 
this paper is an empirically and endogenously determined bi-dimensional specification of 
risk attitudes, sufficient to describe behavior under uncertainty and necessary to explain 
behavior in other contexts. Hopefully, this will assist social scientists to create large data-
sets containing a multidimensional description of individual risk attitudes, while at the 
same time it allows for a robust context, compatible with present and even future more 
complex descriptions of human attitudes towards risk. 
Dependent variable: price
Variable Coefficient Std. Errors
dummy_lose (t-1) 95.09*** 5.63
period -1.55*** 0.18
dummy_t1 73.63*** 18.54
dummy_t2 68.10*** 18.59
dummy_t3 -4.57 18.64
pc1_scores -7.54* 4.02
pc2_scores 20.24*** 6.95
constant 461.70*** 14.53
Number of obs  =  8820
Number of groups =   180
Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects
chi2(1) = 13584.52
Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
(*) significant at 10% confidence level, (**) significant at 5% confidence level, 
(***) significant at 1% confidence level.
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